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Abstract 
The jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals and the admissibility of inter-state claims 
under international law are central to international adjudication, operating as gateway to the 
litigation on the merits – the end goal of the proceedings. Still, these concepts remain inherently 
under-defined, and can be shaped in multiple ways to formulate preliminary objections in 
international litigation in general. International investor-State arbitration adds specific aspects 
and complexities to the issue. This introductory contribution accounts for the theoretical 
deficiencies underpinning the notions of jurisdiction and admissibility with a special focus of 
on international investment arbitration, and introduces the selected case-studies which form 
the subject of this Special Issue’s articles. The recent Urbaser award is also used as an example 
of the unexplored potential of novel – and critical – legal argumentation relating to the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals. 
 
 
Keywords: jurisdiction –– admissibility – investment arbitration – competence – preliminary 
objections – Urbaser – counterclaims.  
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A Introduction 
Investment arbitration1 is a branch of compulsory dispute settlement with a hybrid nature. 
Claims that are normally based on international legal instruments are resolved by tribuna ls 
whose operation may evoke that of commercial arbitration.2 
The lex arbitri governing investment arbitration, especially in matters of procedure, sits at the 
intersection of two legal traditions. When the applicable instruments require construction, or 
even integration, it draws inspiration from the general principles governing the practice of 
international courts and tribunals whilst looking at international commercial arbitration – with 
its usages – as its next of kin. 
The institutions of jurisdiction and admissibility add to the hybrid nature of investment 
arbitration, insofar as they occupy an area of overlap between issues of substance and issues of 
procedure. To borrow again from arbitral jargon, the jurisdiction of investment tribunals and 
the admissibility of investment claims are regulated by the lex contractus as well as the lex 
arbitri. They are governed by the rules to which States agreed when they introduced the 
possibility of compulsory arbitration determining the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral 
tribunal. At the same time, they condition the operation of tribunals within and during the 
proceedings. In other words, questions of jurisdiction and admissibility shape both the whether 
and the how of investment arbitration in any given case. 
                                                                 
1 When a general statement is made, it normally refers to the classic system of investor-State dispute settlement 
based on the appointment of one-off tribunals. The project of establishing permanent courts, currently explored by 
some States and by the European Union, is outside the scope of this analysis unless otherwise noted. 
2 The break-down of the different laws governing all elements of investment arbitration is more complex and 
cannot be summarised without simplification. For a fuller study, see Veijo Heiskanen, “Forbidding depeçage: law 
governing investment treaty arbitration”, 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2008), 367, 375 where the 
following categorisation is made: “Thus, one must distinguish between: (a) the law governing the arbitration 
agreement; (b) the law governing the arbitral proceedings; (c) the law governing the arbitral tribunal; (d) the law 
governing the merits of the claim, or the subject matter of the dispute; and (e) the law governing the recognition, 
enforcement and execution of the award.” This article, and the Special Issue at large, deal primarily with issues 
(a) to (c), with occasional forays into issue (d). For similar reflections, see Ian Laird and Rebecca Askew, “Finality  
Versus Consistency: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System”, 7 Journal of Appellate Practice 
and Process (2005), 285, 285. 
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In international litigation in general, arguments relating to jurisdiction and admissibi lity 
populate the well-travelled battleground of preliminary objections. In this battleground, 
respondents attempt to convince the tribunal to throw the case out, possibly before the merits 
of the claim are even broached. Endless legal creativity and loosely defined concepts, 
combined, give occasion to infinite permutations of objections which challenge the competence 
of the tribunal or the admissibility of a claim, or both. This Special Issue of The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals offers a snapshot of the practice on those issues 
with a specific focus on international investment arbitration, without pretence of classificat io n. 
The fight on the battleground of preliminary objections has opened new fronts, whilst old fronts 
have developed or mutated in recent years. For an instance of the former aspect – of new fronts 
- one may note how the increasing trend of terminating or replacing investment treaties has 
generated a fresh set of jurisdictional objections ratione temporis.3 For an instance of the latter 
aspect – i.e. of old fronts still worth exploring -, one would stress how the familiar struggle to 
distinguish treaty-based and contractual claims, in the presence of umbrella clauses or wide 
arbitration provisions, retains its currency and does not seem to subside.4 
Sometimes, it is even doubtful whether an issue belongs in the preliminary battleground at all. 
This is the case for the question of attribution, arguably a species of the category of défenses au 
fond that retain a preliminary character.5 The obverse scenario – such as that of a jurisdictiona l 
objection that cannot be treated in a preliminary manner – occurs when the defendant challenges 
the application of the instrument containing the State’s consent to arbitration, which is a 
question of applicable law. When, for instance, the respondent contends that the investor is not 
protected under the relevant BIT,6 it raises an objection to jurisdiction ratione personae which, 
however, falls often to be determined together with the merits of the case. 
                                                                 
3 See Andrea Gattini’s contribution to this Special Issue, at ***. 
4 See Mary Footer’s contribution to this Special Issue, at ***. 
5 See Giulio Cortesi’s contribution to this Special Issues, at ***. 
6 Because it does not fit the definition in the treaty, or because of an alleged breach of the legality clause therein. 
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There is no unifying theory that connects the contributions in this Special Issue, and this is what 
makes each of them all the more necessary. Simplification, in this area of law, is not convenient : 
practice rarely springs from general principles. Conversely, scoping exercises which dissect the 
practice are helpful, if necessarily incomplete and periodically obsolete. 
Part B of this introductory contribution addresses the distinction between jurisdiction and 
admissibility, a discrete doctrinal and practical conundrum. Part C introduces the individua l 
contributions which form this Special Issue, emphasising the constellation of questions that 
tribunals face when reviewing jurisdictional objections. In part D, we point to some future fronts 
of the jurisdictional battleground, referring to the recent Urbaser award. Part E contains our 
final thoughts and welcomes the reader to the further instalments of this Special Issue. 
B An Elusive Difference with Unclear Implications 
Jurisdiction and admissibility suffer from conceptual under-definition. The underlining ideas 
are familiar but imprecise. Familiarity and vagueness discourage attempts to assess the precise 
contours of these legal institutions and their interaction. There is no perceived urgency to draw 
a line between the two, and the task is inevitably complicated by the lack of a reliable conceptual 
matrix. As a result, the distinction between the concepts of jurisdiction (competence) and 
admissibility (recevabilité) in investment arbitration is a problem in its own right, which 
regularly emerges in the practice and persists in spite of scholarly attempts to solve it. 
Ultimately, the current situation is quickly summarised. Preliminary objections raised before 
an investment tribunal can assert the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction or the claim’s 
inadmissibility, or both, on the basis of certain circumstances, such as, for instance, the 
investor’s failure to respect a pre-arbitration waiting period. When host States and tribuna ls 
seek to associate the relevant circumstances to the relevant objection – either to the tribuna l’s 
jurisdiction or the admissibility of the claim – there is no predetermined process to guide the 
allocation. 
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Tribunals and scholars turn to adages that have some reassuring value but little analytical force. 
Some truisms recur, as August Reinisch correctly relates in his contribution to this Special 
Issue.7 One is that admissibility review is separate from, and follows necessarily, an affirmative 
finding of jurisdiction. Another is that jurisdictional objections address the powers of the 
tribunal, whilst admissibility objections relate to some flaw affecting the claim or the claimant.  
The Unglaube v. Costa Rica8 tribunal used these two heuristics to characterise the Respondent’s 
argument that the investor’s claim was premature, so long as its application for a development 
permit was still pending before domestic authorities. The Tribunal relied on the distinction in 
hand to justify the treatment of the admissibility objection as non-preliminary in nature and, 
accordingly, to join it to the merits9 as follows 
‘… objections on the ground of admissibility are different in nature from objections to 
jurisdiction. Respondent has not maintained that the Tribunal may not properly rule on these 
matters, but that, it should not – both as a matter of prudence and in consideration of the ongoing 
deliberations of courts and administrative bodies in Costa Rica, which should be permitted to 
complete their functions without interference or interruption’.10 
That the admissibility test follows a finding of jurisdiction is accurate, but the sequencing of 
the two institutions in question does not evince their content. The other point whereby 
jurisdiction concerns tribunals, whilst admissibility concerns claims, seems capable, at least, to 
generate a workable test to distinguish the concepts. Tribunals’ determinations on jurisdic t io n 
and admissibility arguably answer different questions. Namely, whether a) the parties had 
conferred on the tribunal the power to decide on a specific claim, or b) there is anything wrong 
with the claim, or claimant, that prevents the tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction in this 
case. 
                                                                 
7 See August Reinisch, **. 
8 Marion Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award of 16 May 2012. 
9 At the merits stage, in light of the full facts scrutinised, the Tribunal determined that the admissibility objection 
could not stand, see ibid., para. 295. 
10 Ibid., para. 293. Emphasis in the original. 
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However, it is often possible to fit the relevant circumstances in either question. In fact, the 
question whether the parties had conferred on the tribunal the power to decide on pre-mature 
claims raised before the end of the waiting period is just as plausible as the question whether 
the tribunal should reject a pre-mature claim raised before the waiting period was over. Each 
question seems a correct characterisation of the judicial test applicable, and neither falsifies the 
other. Therefore, it must be concluded that the definitions used to indicate the limits of 
jurisdiction and limits of admissibility are not mutually exclusive and, thus, have limited 
definitional power. Tribunals show awareness of the permeability between the two concepts. 
To that end, one may recall the disenchanted words of the tribunal in Apotex v. US 
(UNCITRAL) which concerned with the requirement of finality of judicial acts in connection 
with denial of justice claims and the futility exception: 
‘The Parties have differed … on the precise calibration of the “obviously futile” exception. At 
the outset of the oral hearing, the Tribunal questioned the proper characterisation of this 
objection, and in particular whether it raised an issue of jurisdiction or admissibility, or whether 
it might also be viewed as a preliminary substantive objection. This is a debate with a long 
heritage as a matter of international law, and long-divided views. … In line with both Parties’ 
approach, the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that this objection concerns the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. In the alternative, the Tribunal has also considered the matter in 
terms of the admissibility of claims’.11 
Conceptual blur is harmless when it has no practical consequence. If the only effect of 
successful objections to jurisdiction or admissibility were the impossibility to proceed to the 
merits, a false positive – such as lack of jurisdiction taken for inadmissibility, or vice versa – 
would not matter. However, whether the distinction matters in the practice remains an open 
question. 
                                                                 
11 Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 14 June 2013, para. 258, 260. 
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In the literature, some studies are to be found that purport to list the practical differences 
between a finding of inadmissibility and one of lack of jurisdiction. What follows is a 
distillation from these lists. Namely, the jurisdiction of a tribunal must be assessed only as of 
at the time of the claim, whilst the reasons leading to the inadmissibility of the claim may arise 
during the proceedings; the grounds for inadmissibility may be waived by the parties and be 
subject to different rules of invocability, in the sense that the tribunal might have no obligat ion 
to raise them proprio motu,12 or the parties could lose the right to invoke them after a certain 
phase of the proceedings;13 whereas the jurisdiction of a tribunal is fixed, the inadmissibility of 
a claim does not become res judicata and can sometimes be cured as, for instance, when brought 
anew after the local remedies are exhausted or the waiting period is expired. Furthermore, a 
crucial difference purportedly concerns the possibility of review of decisions,14 in the sense that 
findings on jurisdiction might be subject to the review of a controlling body entitled to ascertain 
that the decision-maker did not exceed its powers, but determinations on the admissibility of a 
claim are final.15 Finally, it has been highlighted how characterising a matter as pertaining to 
                                                                 
12 The seemingly unusual case of Larsen/Hawaii (Lance Larsen v. the Hawaiian Kingdom, PCA, case no. 99-001, 
under the UNCITRAL 1976 Rules, Award, 5 February 2001, (2001) 119 ILR 566; (2001) 95 AJIL 927–933), in 
which the Tribunal appeared to analyse admissibility proprio motu, is exceptional because it deals with a fabricated 
claim in which both parties had no interest in raising procedural objections. An obverse exception might be found 
in Transglobal Green Energy, LLC and Transglobal Green Energy de Panama, S.A. v. The Republic of Panama, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/28, Award of 2 June 2016, where the tribunal noted that the Respondent had failed to 
pursue a jurisdictional objection ratione materiae, and that a decision on it was unnecessary (para. 96). Since the 
claim failed on other preliminary objections, this remark might have been just a signal of judicial economy rather 
than a refusal to observe jurisdictional objections proprio motu. See also ibid., para. 100: “The Tribunal may 
choose to consider the objections to its jurisdiction in any particular order.” On the impossibility to examine 
admissibility flaws proprio motu, see the characterisation of the ICJ’s approach in Hochtief AG v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case no. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 October 2011, para. 5: “[i]n the ICJ, for example, rules 
on admissibility include such matters as the rules on the nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local remedies. 
The ICJ may have jurisdiction to decide whether State A had injured corporation B in violation of international 
law; but it may be that the claim actually filed is inadmissible because it has been brought by the wrong State, or 
because local remedies have not yet been exhausted. But if no objection is raised on such grounds, the Court will 
not raise the matter proprio motu.” 
13  Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, International Arbitral Jurisdiction (2011), 71: “an objection relating to 
recevabilité may be waived or the opportunity to raise it lost, whereas a defect in jurisdiction can technically never 
be cured.” 
14 This distinction is used by Jan Paulsson (see the article “Jurisdiction and Admissibility”, in G. Aksen et al (eds.), 
Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Robert Briner (2005), 601) to highlight the importance of the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility. 
15 This distinction is crucial in the field of international arbitration, where annulment or setting aside of awards is 
typically possible only on narrow grounds which do not include a review of the merits. 
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competence rather than admissibility might affect the logical sequencing of the analysis carried 
out by the tribunal, as well as the allocation of the evidentiary onus between the parties.16 
Whereas some tribunals have considered the distinction to be irrelevant, others have 
endeavoured to put some order in the matter. In Micula, the tribunal echoed some of the 
commonly cited differences between jurisdiction and admissibility stressing how reasons for 
inadmissibility can arise or be removed after the seisin17 and must be raised by the parties – as 
opposed to reasons for lack of jurisdiction which the tribunal can raise motu proprio.18 The 
Achmea tribunal followed closely this canon19 but somewhat revealed its contradictions. First, 
it set a deadline to the respondent for the submission of procedural objections pertaining also 
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 20  warning that further objections would be regarded as 
waived; then it proclaimed that jurisdictional objections must be considered by the tribuna l 
irrespective of the parties’ invoking them, implicating that no waiver is possible and that, 
accordingly, no deadline is applicable.21 In neither dispute did the distinction prove critical to 
the outcome. 
                                                                 
16 Shany, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 130, accompanies the list of these practical consequences 
with a careful assessment of the ‘analytical reasons’ which depend on the correct distinction between jurisdiction  
and admissibility, that is, ‘the distinction may help us better understand the way courts exercise judicial power and 
the legal interests of relevant constituencies affected as they do so.’  
17  Joan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmi1 S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 24 September 2008, para. 
64: “[W]hen an objection relates to a requirement contained in the text on which consent is based, it remains a 
jurisdictional objection. If such a requirement is not satisfied, the Tribunal may not examine the case at all for lack 
of jurisdiction. By contrast, an objection relating to admissibility will not necessarily bar the Tribunal from 
examining the case if the reasons for the inadmissibility of the claim are capable of being removed and are indeed 
removed at a subsequent stage. In other words, consent is a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.” 
18 Ibid., para. 65: “a tribunal can rule on and decline its jurisdiction even where no objection to jurisdiction is raised 
if there are sufficient grounds to do so on the basis of the record.” 
19 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (Number 2), Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility of 20 May 2014. 
20 See the letter to the parties dated 31 March 2013, quoted in footnote 147 of the award: “the Respondent shall 
file a statement containing all and any of its objections to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and to the admissibility  
of Claimant’s claims to be submitted on or before 14 June 2013, failing which the Respondent will have waived 
the possibility to raise any further objections thereafter.” 
21 Achmea supra note 19, para. 120. 
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As recently as 18 January 2017, an ICSID tribunal in Supervision y Control v. Costa Rica22 
took to heart the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility embarking on a digression 
to extol it. The tribunal noted that ‘a court’ might review only findings on jurisdiction, not those 
on admissibility.23 One may find this to be a surprising statement since it comes from an ICSID 
tribunal, whose findings cannot be subject to challenge in domestic courts. The arbitrators went 
on to illustrate the abstract distinction of the targets of either objection,24 as well as the practical 
differences between the two defences in question also drawing from the scholarly narrative, 25 
then reiterated the general statement that “[w]hereas jurisdiction refers to the authority or the 
ability of the Tribunal to hear and decide upon a case, admissibility refers to the characterist ics 
of the claims submitted to arbitration”. 26  It eventually concluded that “because of this 
distinction, questions of jurisdiction must be analysed before answer questions relating to 
admissibility”.27 
This reasoning had little critical bearing on the tribunal’s final decision according to which all 
of the investor’s claim were eventually found inadmissible. Some of them were still pending in 
domestic courts, in contravention of the pre-arbitration requirement to “desist” from domestic 
litigation to access arbitration.28 Others met this requirement, but the investor had raised them 
for the first time during the arbitration, failing therefore to meet the notification requirement 
and the ensuing pre-arbitration waiting period of six months.29 
While the investor’s claim failed at the preliminary stage, the reasons for its dismissal could be 
remedied by the investor retracting from the duplicative proceedings in domestic courts and 
                                                                 
22 Supervision y Control S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/4, Final Award of 18 January 
2017. 
23 Ibid., para. 268. 
24 Ibid., para. 269: “An objection to jurisdiction refers to the ability of a tribunal to hear a case, while an objection 
to admissibility refers to the claim itself, assuming that the tribunal has jurisdiction.” 
25 Michael Waibel, “Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility”, in A. Reinisch et al. (eds.), in August 
Renisch et al (eds), Handbook on International Investment Law (2015), 1212. 
26 Supervision v. Costa Rica, supra note 22, 271.  
27 Ibid., para. 274. 
28 See Article XI.3 of the BIT between Spain and Costa Rica. 
29 Ibid., Article XI.1. 
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complying with the cooling-off condition. In this case, the admissibility paradigm fits better the 
case and, subject to a change of the relevant circumstances, the claim could be brought anew in 
fresh arbitration proceedings. 
Whereas the practice sometimes proves conspicuously that a difference between the two 
procedural institutions in hand does exist – like in the case just discussed –, the theory behind 
the dividing line is still rudimentary. The differences between jurisdictional and admissibi lity 
objections that are often cited have some descriptive value but have limited normative force. It 
will be sufficient here to show the shortcomings of some of distinctions that are most commonly 
invoked. Since the predictive value of a general rule is undermined by the existence of 
exceptions, the following thoughts may discourage reliance on the commonplace distinct ions 
between jurisdiction and admissibility. 
First, the assumption that tribunals must always be satisfied of their jurisdiction proprio motu 
may not be taken for granted under all circumstances. Achmea proved the point, as commented 
above.30 Furthermore, the assertion by which arbitration tribunals are in any case bound to 
assess ex officio the existence of the grounds for their jurisdictional competence appears to 
contravene the pertinent ICSID and UNCITRAL rules. By setting a deadline for jurisdictiona l 
objections they clearly imply that after a critical point in time the tribunal should even ignore 
an objection raised ex parte, let alone entertain it proprio motu.31  
Second, in respect of the burden of proof, its allocation might different with regard to proving 
the grounds of jurisdiction or those of admissibility. This distinction, however, is mostly 
theoretical,32 there is virtually no difference in the practice. Whereas as a general rule it is the 
                                                                 
30 See above, text at notes 19 to 21. 
31 ICSID Convention, Article 41(1), UNCITRAL Rules, Article 21(3); Revised UNCITRAL Rules, Article 23(2). 
On this, see Judith Levine, “Navigating the parallel universe of investor–State arbitrations under the UNCITRAL 
Rules”, in C. Brown and K. Miles (eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (2011), 369, 395. 
32 The investor must prove the existence of the jurisdictional requirements; the State must prove that a claim on 
which jurisdiction exists is inadmissible. See Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, 
Award of 15 April 2009, para. 58-64: “if jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts, they have to be proven 
[not just established prima facie] at the jurisdictional phase”; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, 
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party relying on certain facts that must prove them, 33 it is worth noting how, with respect to an 
objection based on estoppel and abuse of process, the tribunal in Rusoro v. Venezuela34 could 
not resolve itself to classify it as pertaining to jurisdiction or admissibility, but declared that in 
either case the State would equally have to provide the decisive evidence.35 
Third, another oft-cited distinction is the different regime of review of jurisdictiona l 
determinations – i.e. reviewable or annullable -, on the one hand, as opposed to findings on 
admissibility – i.e. immune from review -, on the other. This distinction finds little textual 
rooting in the ICSID system, where the standard for annulment is manifest excess of powers or 
a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.36 A mistaken finding on jurisdict io n 
could within the scope this standard just as well as a mistaken finding on admissibility, provided 
that the critical gravity threshold is reached.37 The ad hoc committee deciding on the annulment 
of the TECO v. Guatemala award clarified that the jurisdiction/admissibility divide is per se 
irrelevant to the success of an annulment application as follows: 
                                                                 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections of 1 June 2012, para. 2.9-
2.11. 
33 See the discussion in Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, and Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña 
of 11 April 2007, para. 138 ff (it was not for the claimant to prove that he was not Egyptian, but for the State to 
support with evidence the relative jurisdictional objection). 
34 Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, Award of 22 August 
2016, para. 350 ff. 
35 Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 34877, Interim Award of 1 December 2008, para. 138-142. 
36 ICSID Convention, Article 52. 
37 Consider the statement of the Committee in the case Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al (case formerly known as 
Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al.) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/27, Decision on Annulment of 9 March 2017, para. 110: “he Committee accepts that there is some force 
in the argument advanced by Venezuela that matters of jurisdiction may call for a more rigorous approach than 
other grounds for annulment, simply because a tribunal ought not to be allowed to exercise a judicial power it does 
not have (or vice versa). The Committee also accepts that there is weight in the Mobil Parties’ contention that 
questions of admissibility may require to be approached in a different way from questions of jurisdiction for the 
purposes of the annulment scheme laid down in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. It is plain on the face of it 
that the reference in Article 52(1)(b) to a tribunal having “manifestly exceeded its powers” fits most naturally into 
the context of jurisdiction, in the sense that it covers the case where a tribunal exercises a judicial power which on 
a proper analysis had not been conferred on it (or vice versa declines to exercise a jurisdiction which it did 
possess).” This obiter dictum, however, does not rule out the possibility of annulment of an admissibility decision, 
and limits itself to note, in the abstract, that the threshold of gravity might be less likely to be met. 
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‘… the Committee wishes to clarify that it cannot accept Guatemala’s theory according to which 
a tribunal’s incorrect decision on jurisdiction can never survive annulment because any excess 
of jurisdiction is necessarily manifest’.38 
In a complementary way, the Urbaser tribunal noted that admissibility findings can be annulled, 
and chastised the attempts to distinguish between admissibility and jurisdiction on the basis of 
annullability. To that end, the tribunal stressed that 
‘under the ICSID system, a decision stating that a claim lacks admissibility may be brought 
before an annulment committee based on one of the grounds listed in Article 52(1) of the 
Convention and in particular when the claimant alleges that the tribunal had ‘manifestly 
exceeded its powers’ (lit. b). This feature of ICSID practice renders both the distinction wrong 
in theory and useless in practice’.39 
Outside the ICSID circuit, the distinction might be relevant, but only in light of the arbitral rules 
applicable in the domestic proceedings. The UNCITRAL Model Law does not seem to use the 
jurisdiction/admissibility distinction as a reference when listing the grounds for setting an award 
aside.40 Whether admissibility decisions are immune from review ultimately depends on how 
the national arbitration law transposed the UNCITRAL grounds. It might be that “lack of 
jurisdiction”41 is listed as a ground for annulment of a tribunal’s award, whereas a mistaken 
finding on admissibility is not. However, this possibility must be ascertained on case by case 
basis, and certainly should not support a general statement on the difference between the 
reviewability of jurisdictional decisions as opposed to that of admissibility ones. 
                                                                 
38  TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Decision on 
Annulment of 5 April 2016, para. 215. 
39  Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Jurisdiction of 12 December 2012, para. 117. 
40 Relevant here are Article 34(2)(a)(ii), Article 34(2)(b)(i) and (ii), regarding excess of authority, non-arbitrability 
of the dispute and the public policy safeguard. 
41 See, for instance, the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law, Chapter 12, Article 190 (Action for 
Annulment). See Susan D. Franck, “The legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration: privatizing public 
international law through inconsistent decisions”, 73 Fordham Law Review (2005), 1521. 
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In essence, both the doctrine and the practice have difficulty in drawing a line between 
jurisdictional and admissibility elements. To the extent that some practical advantages might 
be derived from this state of uncertainty, it is to be expected that parties will try to exploit it. 
This situation renders the tribunals’ task ever more daunting. 
C On This Special Issue – The Contributions 
The article by Jensen Calamita and Elsa Sardinha is the ideal starter for anybody seeking to 
enter the battleground of preliminary questions to survey the deployment of litigation tactics. 
Issues of jurisdiction and admissibility, combined, provide the respondent State with a powerful 
strategic tool to stall the process by seeking bifurcation. While the possibility of bifurcat ion 
responds to considerations of efficiency and judicial economy, its management by tribuna ls 
might affect the fairness of the proceedings.42 Tribunals are used to weighing all the possible 
contingencies to assess whether the more efficient scenarios (bifurcation and no merits; no 
bifurcation and merits) are more likely to occur than the less efficient ones (bifurcation and 
merits stage; no bifurcation with procedural objection upheld). 
The interesting point, however, is not so much whether the procedural objections are likely to 
succeed, since tribunals are careful not to prejudge their determination on jurisdiction in their 
decisions on bifurcation. Rather, it is instructive to observe the tribunals’ prognosis regarding 
how the determination of jurisdictional matters might require, and depend on, the full analysis 
of the merits. In this sense, whilst an inquiry into the alleged failure to notify a dispute before 
arbitration would be severable from the analysis of the merits – thus making bifurcation more 
reasonable –, a preliminary objection regarding the investor’s violation of domestic law might 
be inextricably linked to the defense on the merits and advise against granting a request of 
bifurcation. 
                                                                 
42 For an analysis of the implications on fairness of the tribunals’ practice regarding bifurcation applications in 
inter-State arbitration at the PCA, see Brooks W. Daly and Hugh Meighen, “Procedural Fairness in International 
Arbitration Involving States”, in A. Sarvarian et al (eds.), Procedural Fairness in International Courts and 
Tribunals (2015), 264-269. 
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The focus of Eirik Bjorge’s article is the role of EU law in arbitration raised under intra-EU 
investment agreements. More specifically, the author looks into the Commission’s contention 
that these investment treaties are terminated by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty. Since the 
competence of the tribunals is based on these treaties, this argument seeks to found a powerful 
jurisdictional objection. For all the Commission’s effort – and possibly without prejudice to the 
Member States’ responsibility for infringing EU law in some respect – tribunals have held that 
the BITs remain valid and their application is not displaced by the mere existence of EU law 
regulating the same subject-matters. 
Bjorge’s discussion on disconnection clauses is particularly topical in relation to the yet 
ongoing debate over the EU Commission’s assertion of an “implicit disconnection clause for 
intra-EU relations”. Whereas the analysis is confined to purely treaty issues, the issue offers yet 
another test bed of the direct versus derivative theory of investors’ rights. If one accepted that 
investors are the recipient of actual rights under the treaties, at least with respect to the 
procedural right to invoke the protections therein, it would be difficult to accept that they lose 
such rights simply through the operation of a lex posterior situation. The point proceeds from 
the substantive question whether the EU law is in conflict, vel non, with the ECT or the intra-
EU BITs.43 If the answer were in the negative, investors would retain their right to trigger 
arbitration and tribunals would be expected to confirm their jurisdiction thereupon. 
Mary Footer’s analysis discusses how States shape their arbitration offers so as to expand 
arbitral jurisdiction beyond the substantive reach of an investment treaty, in particular over 
contract-based claims. Competence over claims that do not assert the breach of a treaty standard 
could occur through application of an umbrella clause or through widely worded arbitration 
provisions, making arbitration available over “any dispute relating to the investment”. Several 
complications concerning umbrella clauses still require parsing, and chiefs among them are the 
                                                                 
43 Ibid., para. 438-439. 
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doubts as to whether 1) some conduct jure imperii is needed and 2) the umbrella-based 
jurisdiction of the tribunal operates only in cases of contractual privity between investor and 
host State. 
With respect to the former point, whereas the majority of awards does not consider it necessary, 
still some tribunals use the El Paso test, which rejects the automatic treaty-fication of 
contractual claims when sovereign powers are not deplyed.44 With respect to the latter problem, 
it is still unclear whether an umbrella clause covers only contracts between the investor and the 
host State 45  or, more loosely, contracts involving investor’s subsidiaries or State-owned 
entities.46 The Supervision v. Costa Rica tribunal has had the opportunity, recently, to elaborate 
on this point, using the wording of the specific applicable umbrella clause as the hinge of its 
analysis, as follows: 
‘the protection of [the umbrella clause] goes beyond the simple direct contractual relationship 
between the investor and the host State, because such provision establishes that the State shall 
comply with the obligations undertaken “…related to investments by investors of the other 
Contracting Party …”. Such drafting is sufficiently broad to interpret that the obligations 
contracted by Costa Rica with Riteve, a company controlled by the Claimant and created 
exclusively to hold the rights of the Contract, are included under the scope of protection of the 
Treaty. As a result, the Tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae over the dispute’.47 
It is worth emphasising how the tribunal came to this conclusion noting that the critical element 
of consent - i.e., whether the State Parties had consented to arbitration with respect to non-treaty 
claims - was not given solely “with respect to the investor”, but also “with respect to its 
                                                                 
44 El Paso Energy International Company v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006, para. 82. See, for instance, Supervision v. Costa Rica supra note 22, 282. 
45 As suggested, for example, in Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 
(formerly Burlington Resources Inc. and others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del 
Ecuador (PetroEcuador)), Decision on Liability of 14 December 2012, para. 220. 
46  For a case in which there was absolutely no privity, the contract being concluded between a company 
participated by the Claimant and a State-owned company, see Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing 
Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26, Award of 29 
January 2016, para. 305. 
47 Supervision v. Costa Rica supra note 22, para. 287, emphasis in the original. 
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investments”, including its subsidiaries.48 This decision illustrates the familiar circumstance of 
tribunals using the Vienna Convention paradigm and giving prevalence to literal interpretat ion 
to construe the investment treaties. 
Giulio Cortesi’s article analyses the obverse scenario. Instead of the interplay between the 
investor’s subsidiary and the host State, his focus is on the relationship between the investor 
and State-owned entities (SoE). His careful reconstruction of the law and the case-law revolves 
around two main themes, namely the jurisdiction of tribunals over claims made against SoE 
and the attribution of their actions to the host States. Cortesi shows how these two themes are 
not distinct, unless artificially so. In his view, the issue of attribution must be examined at a 
preliminary stage. This would avoid cases in which the State is not genuinely involved from 
advancing to the merits just because the State was the formal addressee of the claim and the 
tribunal postponed the analysis of attribution to the merits stage. 
His suggestions ring true in light of a case like Tenaris v. Venezuela.49 In this case, the tribunal 
was satisfied of its jurisdiction simply because the claim was addressed to the host State, even 
if the underlying dispute regarded, in part, the performance of a contract concluded between a 
company participated by the Claimant and a State-owned company. In fact, the tribuna l 
addressed the issue of attribution during its analysis of the merits, and ultimately denied the 
possibility of attributing the acts of the SoE to the host State:  
‘The Tribunal accepts Venezuela’s case that [the SoE] had not been specifically empowered by 
the law of the State of Venezuela to distribute pellets, and that its corporate purpose was the 
marketing of iron ore, pellets and fines, which are activities of a private and commercial nature. 
Moreover, its obligations in the context of Matesi were obligations entered into pursuant to the 
Supply Contract, which was a commercial contract. To the extent that the actions of its principal 
shareholder [another SoE] might be said to be relevant, there is nothing in the evidence to 
                                                                 
48 Ibid., para. 289. 
49 Tenaris v. Venezuela supra note 47. 
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suggest that its oversight of [the SoE] went beyond the exercise of general supervision of a kind 
which international tribunals have determined would be insufficient for the purposes of 
attribution’.50 
Whereas the distinction between jurisdiction and attribution holds some taxonomic value, it is 
interesting to see this artificial two-step analysis, especially in a case in which there was no 
bifurcation. The impression is that, for the purpose of jurisdiction, the claimant’s 
characterisation of the defendant is the only relevant criterion. 
In his article, Andrea Gattini delves on the application ratione temporis of investment treaties 
and the connected temporal scope of tribunals’ jurisdiction. His study praises the tribuna ls’ 
close adherence to the canons of treaty interpretation and consent-based jurisdiction. It also 
observes that, when at stake is not so much the existence of consent but the conditions of its 
exercise, tribunals can act pragmatically, for instance enforcing overlooked cooling-off periods 
during the arbitral proceedings, rather than rejecting the claim altogether. 
D Urbaser: A New Front Opened Up 
The ICSID tribunal in the Urbaser v. Argentina dispute, which handed down its final award on 
8 December 2016, might have opened another front of the jurisdictional battleground. 
The remarkable part of the award is not so much the finding against the host State, which led 
to no compensation, but the finding that the tribunal had jurisdiction over the Respondent’s 
counterclaim against the investor, relating to an alleged breach of the human right to water in 
the performance of the State concession concerning water distribution.51 
The investor had opposed the counterclaim, invoking the one-sided nature of investor-State 
arbitration. 52  The Tribunal rejected this argument, referring to the neutral wording of the 
arbitration clause of the BIT, which simply referred to “disputes arising between a Party and an 
                                                                 
50 Tenaris v. Venezuela supra note 46, para. 417. 
51 Urbaser v. Argentina supra note 39, Award of 8 December 2016, para. 1154-1155. 
52 Ibid., para. 1120. 
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investor of the other Party in connection with investments”53 and to the possibility for “either 
party to the dispute”54 to launch arbitration. Indeed, Article 46 of the ICSID Convention tasks 
the tribunal with the determination of “counterclaims arising directly out of the subject-matter 
of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are 
otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Centre.”55 
The tribunal held that the alleged breaches – i.e. the failure to perform sufficient investments 
under the concession and subsequent breach of the right to access to water of the population - 
were connected to the factual matrix of the investment, and that the BIT’s clause on the 
applicable law was wide enough to warrant the application of other instruments of internationa l 
law, including human rights treaties.56 
The tribunal also overcame the crucial investor’s objection that human rights treaties, even if 
applicable in the dispute, could not create obligations for private entities. The arbitrators made 
the point that “the human right for everyone’s dignity and its right for adequate housing and 
living conditions are complemented by an obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not 
to engage in activity aimed at destroying such rights”.57 In the specific case of the right to water, 
however, the tribunal observed that its enforcement “represents an obligation to perform” that 
could only fall on States.58 The counterclaim, therefore, was rejected on the merits. 
The decision raises more questions than it answers. Could the investor, to avoid countercla ims, 
accept the standing offer to arbitrate disputes in the treaty and, contextually, carve out certain 
subject-matters from the acceptance? Is the Urbaser scenario only possible when 1) the 
arbitration clause is not reserved to the investor; 2) it is not confined to claims relating to the 
treaty; and 3) the fulfilment of a human right happens to be connected to the activities of the 
                                                                 
53 Article X(1) of the Spain-Argentina BIT. 
54 Ibid., Article X(3) 
55 Emphasis added. 
56 See Urbaser v. Argentina supra note 51, para. 1188, referring to Article X(5) of the Spain-Argentina BIT. 
57 Ibid., para. 1199. 
58 Ibid., para. 1210. 
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investment at stake in the dispute? Is the tribunal’s conclusion – that the international obligat ion 
to provide water binds only the State – distinguishable with respect to other human rights, or 
with other modes of compliance? Does the tribunal’s reference to “an obligation to abstain”59 
suggest that a duty to respect – as opposed to a duty to provide – might be binding on 
individuals? If all these conditions are met, could the State just bring the same claim against the 
investor in the first place, as a principal claim instead of a counterclaim? 
Allegation of human rights abuses are routinely raised as a defense by the respondent State, to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal or the claim’s admissibility, to rebut the claim on the 
merits or, at least, to influence the degree of liability that the tribunal use as benchmark to 
calculate compensation. In light of Urbaser, however, States might be tempted to explore the 
possibility of counterclaims or even direct claims, if the treaty text allows and the violations are 
sufficiently linked with the operation of an investment. 
E. Final Remarks 
Maybe this Special Issue manages, as Reinisch wishes in his concluding remarks, to shed some 
light on the elusive concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility. At least, it maps the reasons for 
the confusion and, waiting for better definitions, takes stock of selected trends of their 
application in the practice. 
The Urbaser development is just one example of the complications that tribunals encounter 
when they need to determine the existence and the extent of the parties’ consent to arbitratio n. 
A recurring theme of the articles that compose this issue is the reliance on the secondary rules 
of public international law. In case of doubt, it is through the diligent routine of treaty 
interpretation that tribunals reach a decision – or at least provide the reasoning behind a decision 
reached otherwise. In spite of the similarity between the procedures of commercial and 
investment arbitration, investment tribunals are well aware of their capacity as internationa l 
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legal trustees and the limits of their jurisdiction. Their handling of preliminary objections 
constantly reveals the tribunals’ concern not to overstep what is, ultimately, the exercise of a 
conferred jurisdiction (compétence d’attribution).60 
The editors hope that you will enjoy the reading of this Issue. Whether or not you agree with 
each of these articles in full, we hope that they can serve as a source of information and 
intellectual stimulation. 
                                                                 
60 ST-AD GmbH v. Republic of Bulgaria, Award on Jurisdiction, Award on Jurisdiction of 18 July 2013, para. 362. 
